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LEGISLATION
PROPERTY DISPOSITION UPON DIVORCE IN
MARYLAND: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE NEW STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Family law in Maryland is in the midst of revision both by the
courts and by the legislature. In response to a variety of stimuli,
including the adoption in Maryland of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment,' pressure from women's groups seeking equality, pressure
from men's groups seeking greater and more equitable rights in child
custody, the rapidly rising divorce rate, the spread of no-fault
divorce, and a general change in attitude toward the roles of
marriage and the family in our society, both the Maryland General
Assembly and the Maryland courts have recently effected dramatic
and substantive changes in Maryland law.
The changes thus far have affected the law governing a wide
range of domestic law. No longer does the burden of support of minor
children fall entirely upon the father of the family, but rather both
parents have an obligation to contribute to the support of their
children.2 Neither the maternal custody preference for a child of
tender years, 3 nor the presumption that an adulterous parent is an
unfit custodian, 4 remains valid. Alimony may be awarded to either
spouse rather than only to the wife. 5 In sharp contrast to the title
theory governing the division of property upon divorce, which gives
to each spouse the property that he purchased and to which he holds
title, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has recognized a presump-
tion that household furnishings purchased either in contemplation
of marriage or during the marriage are a gift to the marital unit by
the purchasing spouse and are owned as tenants by the entirety.6
1. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46.
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1970). This mutual parental obligation to provide
child support is one that must be allocated by the trial court on both "a sexless
basis" and "in accordance with [the parents'] respective financial resources."
Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 517, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977). Not more than a month
subsequent to the Rand decision, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held
that a trial court had abused its discretion when it "automatically divided the
amount of child support equally between the parents" without taking into
consideration their relative financial conditions. German v. German, 37 Md.
App. 120, 123, 376 A.2d 115, 117 (1977).
3. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978). See Comment,
Best Interests of the Child: Maryland Child Custody Disputes, 37 MD. L. REv.
641, 651-57 (1978).
4. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231 (1977). See generally 7 U. BALT. L.
REV. 141 (1977).
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 3 (1973). Cf. Orr v. Orr, 47 U.S.L.W. 4224 (U.S. 1979)(state statute that limited alimony obligations to husbands held to violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
6. Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 386 A.2d 772 (1978).
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Courts of equity, sitting as divorce courts, which had been limited
traditionally in their powers to those of the English Ecclesiastical
Courts, recently have been granted all equitable powers.7 The
traditional doctrine of interspousal tort immunity has been partially
abrogated by allowing a spouse a cause of action for outrageous
intentional torts.8  This trend towards abrogating traditional
principles governing the relationship among the husband, the wife
and the family during and after the marriage can be expected to
continue. In February 1977, Governor Marvin Mandel appointed a
Commission on Domestic Relations to conduct a review of the
constitutional, statutory and common law applicable to domestic
relations and to suggest legislation to the General Assembly. 9
The 1978 Session of the General Assembly adopted two bills in
the field of domestic relations that follow this trend, both of which
were signed by the Governor and are in force. 10 The first is a long-
arm statute giving Maryland courts jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant in any civil proceeding arising out of the marital
relationship.1" Under this statute, the courts have authority to award
child support, spousal support, and counsel fees, provided that the
non-resident defendant has been personally served with process in
accordance with the Maryland Rules of Procedure, 12 that Maryland
was the state of the matrimonial domicile immediately prior to
separation, 13 and that the obligation to pay support or counsel fees
arose under either the laws of Maryland or an agreement executed in
Maryland by one of the parties. 14 Jurisdiction also extends to any
civil proceeding arising out of the marital relationship.' 5
This article, however, will discuss in detail only the second
domestic relations statute adopted by the 1978 legislative session.
The passage of that statute, Senate Bill 604,16 substantially changed
Maryland law by authorizing courts, in a divorce or annulment
7. See Law of April 29, 1977, ch. 221, 1977 Md. Laws 1866 (preamble).
8. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
9. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS
(Jan. 1978).
10. S. 604, Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304 (codified at MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-603 to 3-6A-07 (Supp. 1978)); S. 553, Act of May 16,
1978, ch. 476, 1978 Md. Laws 1641 (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§6-103.1 (Supp. 1978)).
11. Id. For a discussion of the constitutional requirements of a long-arm statute, see
Strausberg, The Abandoned Spouse: Alimony and Support Actions, and the
Maryland Long Arm Statute, 37 MD. L. REV. 227 (1977).
12. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103.1 (Supp. 1978). Md. Rule 107 provides
for service of process outside the state.
13. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §6-103.1 (Supp. 1978).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Law of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304 (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§3-603 to 3-6A-07 (Supp. 1978)). The General Assembly
passed the bill on the final day of the 1978 legislative session.
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proceeding, to allocate the assets acquired during the marriage by
the grant of a monetary award 17 and to provide for the use and
possession of certain property. 18 This statute brings Maryland law
closer to the modern view that marriage is a partnership between
equals, and establishes that state policy recognizes non-monetary as
well as monetary contributions to a family. 19 Although the law does
not empower courts to change title to property,1° it does grant power
to effect an equitable distribution of property acquired during the
marriage by. providing for a monetary award to reflect an equal
division of the value of marital property. Discretionary deviation
from this equal division is permissible, provided the courts consider
certain enumerated factors. 21 Likewise, the statute enumerates the
factors to be considered in granting a use and possession award of
the family home and personal property used in the home to a spouse
with custody of a minor child.22
This article will analyze Maryland law prior to January 1, 1979,
the substantive provisions of the new statute, and the ambiguities
and problems of the statute that may require either litigation or
further legislative action for clarification and improvement.
II. PRIOR LAW
The new statute expressly provides that it is applicable only to
cases filed after January 1, 1979.23 All cases filed prior to that date
17. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05 (Supp. 1978).
18. Id. §3-6A-06.
19. Id. §3-6A-05(b)(1). The Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations Laws
concluded that "non-monetary contributions within a marriage are real and
should be recognized." REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC
RELATIONS LAws 3 (Jan. 1978). Also, "[t]he General Assembly declare[d] that it is
the policy of this State that marriage is a union between a man and woman
having equal rights under the law." Law of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws
2304, 2305.
20. "[T]he court may not transfer the ownership of real property from one spouse to
the other." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-04(a) (Supp. 1978). "[Tjhe
court may not transfer ownership of personal property from one spouse to the
other." Id. § 3-6A-03.
21. See id. § 3-6A-05(b)(1)-(9).
22. See id. § 3-6A-06(a)(1)-(4).
23. Law of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, §2, 1978 Md. Laws 2304, 2311. Several interim
problems exist with this statute in determining whether the new law would apply
to certain cases. Because the statute applies to cases filed after January 1, 1979, a
litigant probably cannot return to court to modify or request relief under the
provisions of the new law when a judgment has been rendered prior to the
effective date. It is unclear whether an action filed prior to January 1, 1979, can
be amended or supplemented and thereby qualify as a new action within the
statutory provisions. The Maryland Attorney General has concluded, however,
that the statute applies to causes of action arising before January 1, 1979, which
culminate in a decree of divorce based upon a bill of complaint filed subsequent
to that date. Md. Att'y Gen. Op., Daily Record, Dec. 30, 1978 at 4, col. 2. Nor is it
clear whether a divorce petition filed prior to January 1, 1979 could be dismissed
and a new divorce petition filed after January 1, 1979. Md. Rule 582 provides that
equity actions may be dismissed with leave of the court, but a court has no
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are subject to the previous law. In granting a divorce a mensa et
thoro, Maryland courts have had the statutory authority to
award to the wife such property or estate as she had when
married or the value of the same, or of such part thereof as
may have been sold or converted by the husband having
regard to the circumstances of the husband at the time of the
divorce, or such part of any such property as the court may
deem reasonable. 24
Despite the seemingly broad language of the statute, court decisions
have limited its application to instances where there is an express
agreement to repay the wife.
25
Under prior law, in most cases distribution of property upon
divorce or annulment depended upon who held record title. 26 In
distributing property upon the dissolution of a marriage, courts of
equity had the authority only to
[D]etermine ownership of personal property other than
chattels real, held, possessed or claimed by a party to the
divorce proceeding, and in accordance with that determina-
tion, may:
(1) Make a division of the personal property between
the parties;
discretion and must dismiss so long as the opposing party has not become
entitled to affirmative relief. Byron Lasky & Assocs. v. Cameron-Brown Co., 33
Md. App. 231, 364 A.2d 109 (1976).
Counterclaims under the Maryland Rules of Procedure are permissive. Md.
Rule 314. Consequently, itis not clear which law would apply if one spouse filed
a bill for divorce prior to January 1, 1979 and the other filed after that date. It is
unclear whether the filing of the second divorce action would withstand a
preliminary objection on the basis of the pendency of another action between the
same parties for the same cause. Md. Rule 323. If the second bill for divorce
withstands a preliminary objection, it is not clear what law would apply if the
cases were consolidated. Md. Rules 603, 606 and 697 deal with consolidation,
allowing wide discretion to the court. The court may render separate judgments,
Md. Rule 606, and may dismiss one bill and hear the other. Coppage v. Resolute
Ins. Co., 264 Md. 261, 285 A.2d 626 (1972).
Most statutes adopted by the legislature become effective July 1 of the year
of the legislative session. This statute was drafted with special effective date to
allow time for education of the public and members of the Bar. REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAws 13 (Jan. 1978).
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (1973). Under the Equal Rights Amendment, MD.
CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46, this provision extends to husbands.
25. Smith v. Smith, 37 Md. App. 277, 376 A.2d 1164 (1977) (citing cases).
26. See, e.g., Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 112 A.2d 466 (1955); Sody v. Sody, 32 Md.
App. 644, 363 A.2d 568 (1976); Abell v. Abell, 12 Md. App. 99, 277 A.2d 629 (1971);
Joyce v. Joyce, 10 Md. App. 516, 276 A.2d 692 (1970). This line of cases indicates
that the court lacks jurisdiction to award the personal property of one spouse to
the other. Courts also lack authority to change the parties' rights or estates in
real property. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 32, 48 A.2d 451, 457
(1946). Title to property is nonetheless subject to the equitable doctrine of
resulting trusts. Ensor v. Ensor, 270 Md. 549, 312 A.2d 86 (1975); Richardson v.
Richardson, 17 Md. App. 665, 304 A.2d 1 (1973).
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(2) Order a sale of personal property and a division of
the proceeds; or
(3) Make any other disposition of personal property it
deems proper.
27
The court of appeals consistently strictly interpreted this statute.
In most cases where property was found to have been jointly owned,
the court divided the property equally.28 Where only one spouse
contributed funds to the purchase of jointly titled property, there was
presumed to have been a gift of a one-half interest to the non-
contributing spouse, 29 absent a showing of coercion or undue
influence. 30 In cases where the property was titled in the name of one
spouse only, however, the former statute was held not to empower
the courts to transfer title or grant a monetary award to the non-
property owning spouse.31 Consequently, this statute enabled the
court to resolve only ownership disputes. 32
In resolving such ownership disputes, the courts considered
several principles. First, a presumption of ownership was raised
when record title was traced to a spouse. This record title was
conclusive unless either rebutted by evidence of fraud or undue
influence,33 or a resulting trust could be established by proof that the
27. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-603(c) (1974). Divorce was unknown at
common law. The authority of the courts over divorce and annulment and their
concomitant power to divide and distribute property are entirely statutory.
Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490, 386 A.2d 766, 770 (1978). Section 3-603 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article has its foundation in the powers of
the Ecclesiastical Courts of England. See Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21,
29, 48 A.2d 451, 456 (1946). In fact, the code specifically mentions those English
courts. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-603(a) (1974). The powers of the
Ecclesiastical Courts of England did not enable a divorce court to exercise
ordinary equity jurisdiction. Thus, a Maryland divorce court was governed by
the limited powers established in the Ecclesiastical Courts. Kapneck v. Kapneck,
31 Md. App. 410, 413-14, 356 A.2d 572, 576 (1976). Because these English courts
lacked the authority to apply general equity rules, the court of special appeals in
Kapneck prohibited the issuance of an injunction in a divorce proceeding. Id. at
419, 256 A.2d at 578.
In order to enlarge the limited scope of authority of divorce courts, as
determined in Kapneck, the General Assembly amended the statute governing
court authority in an action for divorce or annulment. Law of April 29, 1977, ch.
221, 1977 Md. Laws 1866 (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 3-603(b) (Supp. 1978)). The amended statute currently provides in pertinent
part: "Injunction - A court of equity sitting in an action for divorce, alimony, or
annulment has all the powers of a court of equity, and may issue an injunction to
protect any party to the action from physical harm or harassment." Id.
28. E.g., Sody v. Sody, 32 Md. App. 644, 363 A.2d 568 (1976).
29. Klavans v. Klavans, 23 Md. App. 144, 146, 326 A.2d 26, 27 (1974) (citing cases).
30. Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690, 692, 72 A. 414, 415 (1909).
31. Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 129-30, 252 A.2d 171, 173- 74 (1969); Brucker v.
Benson, 209 Md. 247, 250-51,121 A.2d 230, 232-33 (1956); Smith v. Smith, 37 Md.
App. 277, 281-82, 376 A.2d 1164, 1167 (1977).
32. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-603(c) (1974).
33. Cf. Brucker v. Benson, 209 Md. 247, 253, 121 A.2d 230, 233 (1956) (court refused to
address the effect of "fraud or concealment" on the ground that such question
was not presented by the case).
Baltimore Law Review
parties did not intend the beneficial interest to run with legal title.34
The rule that record title was conclusive of ownership applied even
though one spouse made non-monetary contributions to the
marriage that enabled the other to purchase the property.35 The work
efforts of the parties were not considered in determining ownership if
only one party had record title.36 Thus, a wife's payment of
household expenses did not give her an interest in property titled
solely in her husband's name. 7
Second, where record title to a particular asset did not exist, the
court determined ownership by looking to the factual circumstances
of the property's acquisition. The source of the funds contributed to
the acquisition of property was an important consideration, but the
burden of tracing the funds was on the spouse asserting the
contribution. 38 Non-monetary contributions were not taken into
consideration in calculating contributions to property and determin-
ing ownership. 39 Recently, however, the court of appeals limited the
effect of this rule with respect to household goods and furnishings.
In Bender v. Bender,40 the court held that household goods and
furnishings purchased either during the marriage or in contempla-
tion of marriage are presumed to be a gift to the marital unit, and
that consequently such property is held as tenants by the entirety. 41
It was undisputed in Bender that the husband was the only spouse
with income, and thus, the only one who could have contributed
monetarily to the purchase of the disputed property. Apparently the
presumption of joint ownership of household goods and furnishings
can only be rebutted by evidence of record title, some other written
record of purchase, or proof of an intention that the property remain
separate property. 42
Prior law, however, granted only limited jurisdiction over real
property to a divorce court. 43 Upon a divorce a vinculo matrimonii
property held as tenants by the entirety was converted by operation
34. Mountford v. Mountford, 181 Md. 212, 218, 29 A.2d 258, 262 (1942).
35. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
36. Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 130, 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969).
37. Woodall v. Woodall, 16 Md. App. 17, 25, 293 A.2d 839, 843 (1972).
38. See id. at 25, 293 A.2d at 843-44.
39. Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 252 A.2d 171 (1969).
40. 282 Md. 525, 386 A.2d 772 (1978).
41. Id. at 534, 386 A.2d at 778-79. Tenancies by the entirety, permitted only between
husband and wife, may not be severed during the lives of the spouses without
their joint action. Schilbach v. Schilbach, 171 Md. 405, 407-08,189 A. 432, 433-34
(1937). The effect of a divorce a vinculo matrimonii upon a tenancy by the
entirety is to convert it into a tenancy in common. Tucker v. Dudley, 223 Md. 467,
164 A.2d 891 (1960). A divorce a mensa et thoro, however, has "no effect
whatsoever" upon a tenancy by the entirety. Eberly v. Eberly, 12 Md. App. 117,
123, 278 A.2d 107, 110 (1971) (per curiam).
42. The Bender court did not indicate the degree of proof necessary to rebut the
presumption.
43. Hall v. Hall, 32 Md. App. 363, 372, 362 A.2d 648, 653 (1976).
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of law into a tenancy in common.4 4 Thus, the court could provide the
traditional common law remedy of partition or sale. The court had
the authority to sell such property and distribute the proceeds to the
parties according to their interests should it be unable to make an
equitable partition.45
In sum, in those cases in which only one spouse worked and title
to all real property was in that spouse's name, the non-working
spouse was generally not entitled to any of that property upon
divorce. Although courts do have discretion to award alimony, 46
which may offset this inequity, it has proven in many cases a less
than satisfactory alternative. Alimony does not survive the death of
the spouse ordered to pay;47 it is contingent upon the recipient spouse
remaining unmarried; 48 and it is available only to a spouse who is
"free of fault" at the time of the divorce. 49 Thus, a spouse's alimony
rights are subject to conditions not generally associated with a
division of property.
III. CURRENT LAW
A. Legislative History
On February 6, 1977, Governor Marvin Mandel established the
Governor's Commission on Domestic Relations. The Commission is
charged with reviewing the constitutional, statutory and common
law applicable to domestic relations. The Commission's first action
was to review Maryland law concerning the disposition of property
when divorce or annulment occur ° This review resulted in proposed
legislation 51 that sought to remedy the "perceived inequity in pres-
44. Keen v. Keen, 191 Md. 31, 37-38, 60 A.2d 200, 204 (1948); Hall v. Hall, 32 Md.
App. 363, 372-73, 362 A.2d 648, 653 (1976). The rule that a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii based upon adultery "works a divestiture of the interest. of the
wrongdoer in the real property purchased solely with the funds of the innocent
spouse, and held in a tenancy by the entirety" does not apply in Maryland.
McCally v. McCally, 250 Md. 541, 545-48, 243 A.2d 538, 541-43 (1968).
45. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-107(a) (1974).
46. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-603(a) (Supp. 1978).
47. Cf. Bellofatto v. Bellofatto, 245 Md. 379, 385, 226 A.2d 313, 316 (1967) (support
payments provided for in separation agreement held not to be alimony because
the payments were "not limited to the joint lives of the spouses"); Woodham v.
Woodham, 235 Md. 356, 360, 201 A.2d 674, 676 (1964) (payments that the
agreement "does not cut off . . . at the death of the husband" cannot be
considered alimony).
48. Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 613, 6 A.2d 366, 369 (1939); Simpson v. Simpson, 18
Md. App. 626, 628, 308 A.2d 410, 412 (1973).
49. Renner v. Renner, 16 Md. App. 143, 160, 294 A.2d 671, 680 (1972) (quotingFlanagan v. Flanagan, 14 Md. App. 648, 288 A.2d 225 (1972)).
50. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS
(Jan. 1978) (Letter from Beverly Anne Groner, Chairman of the Governor's
Commission on Domestic Relations Laws, to Acting Governor Blair Lee, III
(January 9, 1978)).
51. S. 604 (1978); H. 949 (1978).
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ent Maryland law governing the disposition of real and personal
property upon divorce or annulment. '52
In January 1978 legislation drafted by the Commission, offering
substantial changes in existing law, was introduced concurrently in
both houses of the General Assembly. 53 The changes proposed were
in part prompted by the Commission's belief that the people of
Maryland view the spouse whose contributions to a family are non-
income producing as having contributed nevertheless to the
purchase of property.5 4 The Commission's proposed legislation was
thus designed to reflect its perception of the current view of
Maryland's citizens.
The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee acted first on the
legislation. Although the Committee adopted the basic reforms
proposed by the Commission, it offered substantial changes for
consideration by the Senate. 55 The changes would have authorized
52. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS 2 (Jan.
1978). This "perceived inequity" is demonstrated by the case of Woodall v.
Woodall, 16 Md. App. 17, 293 A.2d 839 (1972), decided by the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. In Woodall, the wife had worked during periods of the
marriage and had paid for some of the family household expenses. The husband,
in the meantime, used portions of his salary to acquire stocks and other
securities, which he registered in his name alone. At the time of the divorce, the
wife was not entitled to a share of the value of the securities, despite her
monetary contributions to the family. Id. at 25, 293 A.2d at 843. The court of
special appeals relied upon Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 252 A.2d 171
(1969), in which the court of appeals reversed a cash award to a wife for her
services over the years as a homemaker, hostess, and secretary because she was
not the record owner of the property and had made no monetary contribution
toward its purchase. The disallowance of such monetary claims was followed by
the court of special appeals in Smith v. Smith, 37 Md. App. 277, 376 A.2d 1164
(1977).
53. S. 604 (1978); H. 949 (1978). The bill proposed by the Commission was different in
several significant respects from the enacted legislation. For example, the
Commission proposed that the use and possession award of the family home and
family use personal property could be granted for an unlimited period of time,
and that title to family use personal property could be transferred from one
spouse to the other. Although the use and possession award was primarily to
benefit minor children, custody of a minor child was not an absolute necessity.
The original bill provided that the interest of a spouse in using the home for the
production of income was sufficient to permit use and possession of the home.
Also, property acquired by one spouse by gift or inheritance was not excluded
from the definition of marital property and would have been divided the same as
any other property acquired during the marriage.
The Commission's proposals were met with various objections. The
definition of marital property was attacked as being overly broad because it
included property acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse. See undated
Memorandum from Maryland Trial Lawyers' Association to the Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee. Additionally, concern was expressed that the lack of
adequate guidelines for the distribution of property could generate increased
litigation and thus result in delay and uncertainty. See Release from the
National Organization for Women, dated April 10, 1978; Women's Law Center
Analysis of H.B. 949 and S.B. 604.
54. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAws 3 (Jan.
1978).
55. See S. 604 (1978) (Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee Reprint).
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an equal division of the value of the assets acquired during the
marriage by means of a monetary award to compensate the spouse
owning less than fifty percent of the assets.56 The Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee proposal was rejected, however, by the full
Senate, which offered amendments of its own to the Commission
bill.5 7
The Judiciary Committee of the House of Delegates began
consideration of the legislation, with the Senate amendments, on
Friday, April 7 and concluded Saturday, April 8. The Committee
made substantial changes in the Senate version of the proposed
legislation.58 With the exception of one minor amendment, the bill,
as amended by the House Judiciary Committee was adopted by the
General Assembly on the final day of the 1978 legislative session,
Monday, April 10, 1978.
The statute limits the effect of the title theory of property when a
divorce or annulment occurs. The new law repealed subsection
3-603(c) of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code
56. Id. §3-6A-05(8). The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee offered other
important amendments. The amendments excluded property acquired by gift or
inheritance from the definitions of marital property. In addition, property subject
to a use and possession award was excluded from the initial determination of
marital property and, therefore, from the cash award. Further, the family use
personal property section was redrafted to be parallel to the family home section.
Also, the Committee proposal contained its own enforcement mechanism, which
provided that the filing of the divorce operated as lis pendens.
57. See S. 604 (1978) (2nd Reader with Senate amendments). Although the Senate
rejected the bill offered by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, several of
the proposals were adopted by the Senate. The Senate rejected the absolute 50-50
split of the value of the property, but added a "presumption of equality" in
dividing the value of marital property. Prior acquired property and property
received by gift or inheritance was excluded from the marital property definition.
The use and possession award was limited to three years and upon termination
the property would become marital property and would be divided accordingly.
The Senate added a factor to be considered in determining whether to order a use
and possession award, namely, hardship to the other spouse. MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §3-6A-06(a)(4) (Supp. 1978).
58. See Amendments to Senate Bill No. 604 (3d Reading File Bill) by the House
Judiciary Committee. The House Judiciary Committee rejected the presumption
of equality adopted by the Senate. The Committee added amendments which
provided that a use and possession award could only be made to a spouse with
custody of a minor child and that the award would terminate if the spouse
remarried. Additionally, the amendment redefined minor child to include a child
over 18 years of age who was disabled and dependent upon the parent. The
Committee also excluded property received by gift or inheritance from the
definition of family home.
Other Committee amendments provided that if a use and possession award
was granted as part of a divorce a mensa et thoro, then the use and possession
award could not be made effective for another three years in a subsequent action
for a divorce a vinculo. The Senate added an enforcing mechanism, on the
condition that the section providing that a monetary award was a judgment was
deleted, and the Committee bill provided that the award may be reduced to a
judgment to the extent that any part of the award is due and owing. Other
amendments added by the Judiciary Committee are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 135, 177 through 185 infra.
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Annotated and enacted in its place a new subtitle entitled "Property
Disposition in Divorce and Annulment." 59 The primary significance
of the new law stems from the tri-partite categorization of certain
real and personal property and the courts' concomitant powers
regarding such property. The three new categories of property are
marital property, the family home, and family use personal property.
Although courts may not change title to property under the new
law,6° they are given authority to provide a substitute for property
division by granting a monetary award. 61 This award is intended to
compensate a spouse who holds title to less than an equitable
portion of the property accumulated during the marriage.
6 2
B. Marital Property
Marital property, as defined by the new law, consists of,
all property, however titled, acquired by either or both
spouses during their marriage. It does not include property
acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by
inheritance or gift from a third party, or property excluded
by valid agreement or property directly traceable to any of
these sources.63
Additionally, "[f]amily use personal property or the family home
shall not be considered marital property so long as it is the subject of
a use and possession order." 64
The statute prescribes a three-step process for the court's use in
determining a monetary award. Initially, the court must determine
what property is marital property. Second, the court must determine
the value of such property. This determination may be made
pursuant to a grant of an absolute divorce or annulment, or during a
ninety-day period thereafter should the court reserve the right to do
so, and if property division is at issue.65 Finally, after making these
59. Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, § 2, 1978 Md. Laws 2304, 2311. The preamble to the
new statute indicated a legislative intention that "property interests of the
spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably." Id. at 2305. The use of the term
"Property Disposition" in the title of the statute is a misnomer. The court does
not have the authority to "dispose" of property. Rather, its authority is limited to
making monetary awards, awarding temporary use and possession of property,
and determining questions of ownership.
60. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§3-6A-03(a), 3-6A-04(a) (Supp. 1978).
61. Id. §§ 3-6A-05, 3-6A-06.
62. Id. § 3-6A-05(b).
63. Id. § 3-6A-01(e).
64. Id. § 3-6A-05(a). For a discussion of family use personal property and the family
home, see text accompanying notes 71 through 83 infra.
65. Id. In contrast to the court's authority to order a use and possession award
pursuant to a limited or absolute divorce or annulment, the court's power in
determining marital property is limited to situations involving absolute divorce
or annulment. Compare § 3-6A-06(b) with § 3-6A-05(a).
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determinations, the court may make a monetary award in order to
adjust the equities of the parties, "whether or not alimony is
awarded." 66 The court also has the power to determine the method of
payment of the monetary award.67 Although the court is not
empowered to change the title to property,68 the monetary award
may have that effect nonetheless because sale of the property may
.be necessary to satisfy the award.
The court, in determining the amount of the monetary award
and the method of payment, is directed to consider the following:
(1) The contributions, monetary and non-monetary, of
.each party to the well-being of the family;
(2) The value of all property interests of each spouse;
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time
the award is to be made;
(4) The circumstances and facts which contributed to the
estrangement of the parties;
(5) The duration of the marriage;
(6) The age and the physical and mental condition of the
parties;
(7) How and when specific marital property was acquired
including the effort expended by each party in
accumulating the marital property;
(8) Any award or other provision which the court has
made under this subtitle 6A with respect to the family
use personal property or the family home, and any
award of alimony; and
(9) Such other factors as the court deems necessary or
appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and
equitable monetary award. 69
C. Family Home and Family Use Personal Property
A significant aspect of the new statute is its provision that the
court may order the use and possession of the family home and of
the family use personal property for a period of three years following
a final divorce decree.
The family home is defined as property in Maryland that,
(1) Was used as the principal residence of the spouses when
they lived together, (2) at the time of the proceeding is owned
or leased by at least one of the spouses, and (3) is being used
66. Id. §3-6A-05(b).
67. Id.
68. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
69. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05(b)(1)-(9) (Supp. 1978).
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or will be used by at least one of the spouses and a minor
child as their principal residence. It does not include
property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired
by inheritance or gift from a third party, or property
excluded by valid agreement. 70
Family use personal property consists of,
tangible personal property, acquired during the marriage,
owned by either spouse or owned jointly by both spouses,
and used primarily for family purposes. It includes motor
vehicles, furniture, furnishings and household appliances.
However, it does not include property acquired by inherit-
ance or gift from a third party.71
The court, when granting a limited divorce, an absolute
divorce,72 or an annulment, is empowered to "determine which
property is the family home and family use personal property."73 As
part of the court's pendente lite powers, the court may make this
determination preliminarily and, after considering the factors for a
final award, may award possession during the pendency of the
divorce proceeding 74 to a spouse with custody of a minor child. 75
In determining whether to order use and possession, the court
must consider
(1) The best interests of any minor child;
(2) The respective interests of each spouse in continuing to
use the family use personal property or occupy or use the
family home or any portion of it as a dwelling place;
70. Id. §3-6A-01(b).
71. Id. §3-6A-01(c).
72. A limited divorce is a divorce a mensa et thoro. Such a decree gives the injured
spouse the right to live separate and apart from the one at fault. The parties,
however, remain "man and wife and there is no severance of the marital bonds."
Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 188, 129 A.2d 917, 920 (1957) (emphasis in
original). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (Supp. 1978). A divorce a vinculo
matrimonii is a "divorce from the bond of marriage. It is a total divorce of
husband and wife, dissolving the marital tie, and releasing the parties wholly
from their matrimonial obligations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (4th ed.
1968); See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1978).
73. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-06(b) (Supp. 1978).
74. Id. § 3-6A-06(d) (Supp. 1978). The court's pendente lite powers are broad with
respect to property. See Md. Rule 532 (at law) and Md. Rule 572 (at equity).
75. Id. § 3-6A-06(a) (Supp. 1978). A minor child includes a child 18 years or older
who is dependent upon a parent because of mental or physical disability. Id.
§3-6A-01(d). The statute does not include .a requirement that the child be a
product of the marriage between the two spouses involved in the divorce.
Presumably, a child of either spouse by a prior marriage or even an unrelated
child in the custody of a party would be sufficient to permit a use and possession
award. See Law of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304, 2309, where
"children of the parties" was deleted from the original language of the statute.
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(3) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to
use the family use personal property or occupy or use the
family home or any part of it for the production of income;
(4) Any hardship imposed upon the spouse whose interest
in the family home is infringed upon by a use and
possession order.76
A possession and use order may be granted for a period not to
exceed three years from the date the divorce or annulment is
granted. Therefore, if the grant is made pursuant to a divorce a
mensa et thoro, it may not be lengthened by a subsequent divorce a
vinculo matrimonii.7 7 The court also has the concurrent authority to
order either party, or both, to pay the mortgage, rent or other
indebtedness as well as maintenance, insurance, taxes and similar
expenses related to the property.7 8 A use and possession award is not
absolute, however, because it is subject to any terms or conditions
imposed by the court and may be modified or dissolved as
circumstances and justice require.79 Moreover, the use and posses-
sion award terminates if the beneficiary spouse remarries.80 Because
the award of the family home and family use personal property is
contingent upon the recipient's having custody of a minor child,8'
presumably the award would terminate if the custody terminated or
when the child reaches majority. Upon termination or expiration of
the use and possession award, or if the court declines to make such
an award, the family home and family use personal property is
treated as marital property, provided it fits within the definition of
marital property.8 2
The statute provides that the determination of what is marital
property be made at the time of granting of the divorce or within a
ninety-day period following the granting of the divorce if the court
expressly reserves such right.8 3 Consequently, if this determination
is to be postponed, the attorney drafting the decree of divorce must
set forth this express reservation in the decree and be certain that
the subsequent order is signed within the ninety-day time limitation.
76. Id. § 3-6A-06(a)(1)-(4). The considerations seem to reflect, in part, the purpose of
the newly created court authority; that is, to "permit the children of the family to
continue to live in the environment and community which is familiar to them"
and to permit the use and possession of the family home and family use personal
property by a spouse with custody of a minor child who is in need of such a use
and possession award. Id.
77. Id. § 3-6A-06(e).
78. Id. § 3-6A-06(c)(2).
79. Id. §3-6A-06(e).
80. Id. § 3-6A-06(a).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 3-6A-06(f)-(g). For the definition of marital property, see text accompany-
ing notes 64 through 70 supra.
83. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05(a) (Supp. 1978).
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Because of the ninety-day limit, practitioners should also request
that the judge determine at the time of the initial divorce decree
whether property subject to a use and possession award will be
treated as marital property or separate property upon the expiration
of the award.
D. Personal and Real Property
Because the definition of marital property excludes property
acquired by gift or inheritance, property acquired prior to marriage,
and property excluded by valid agreement,8 4 the court is authorized,
when granting a limited or absolute divorce or annulment, to resolve
differences between the spouses regarding the ownership of this non-
marital personal property. The court may also be asked to settle
questions of ownership both of property that qualifies as marital
property and of property that is jointly owned.8 5 In determining
ownership the court may,
(1) Grant a decree which states what the ownership
interest of each spouse is; and
(2) As to any jointly held property, order a partition or sale
in lieu of partition and a division of the proceeds.8 6
Thus, the court's authority over personal property does not differ
substantially from the former law.
Unlike the former law, which did not give courts jurisdiction
over real property, the new statute provides the court with
substantially the same powers over real property as it has over
personalty. The court's jurisdiction is limited, however, to instances
where an absolute divorce or annulment is granted.8 7 Another
significant change from the former law is that the court's new
authority to partition or to order a sale and division of the proceeds
of jointly owned property avoids the necessity for a separate court
proceeding after divorce or annulment to divide jointly owned real
property.8 8
E. Summary
In summary, a court may, pursuant to a divorce a mensa et
thoro, award -use and possession of the family home and the
84. Id. §3-6A-01(e).
85. Id. §3-6A-03.
86. Id. §3-6A-03(b).
87. Id. §3-6A-04(a).
88. Id. § 3-6A-04(b)(2). See text accompanying notes 43 through 46 supra. This could
create venue problems where real property located in one county is involved, and
the bill for divorce or annulment is filed in another county. See id. § 6-203(b); Md.
Rule BR 5.
390 [Vol. 8
Property Disposition Upon Divorce
personal property used in the home to a spouse with custody of a
minor child. The court may also resolve disputes between the parties
involving the ownership of personal property and may order a
partition or a sale and division of the proceeds of the property that is
jointly owned.
In granting a divorce a vinculo, the court has the same powers
with respect to the disposition of property as it does in granting a
divorce a mensa, except that if use of the family home has been
previously awarded for three years pursuant to a divorce a mensa, it
may not be awarded again. In addition, the court must also calculate
the value of the property owned by each spouse, and, after
considering enumerated equitable factors, may make a monetary
award to ensure that the value of the property owned by each spouse
is equitable. Additionally, the court may resolve ownership disputes
involving real property and may partition jointly owned property or
order its sale and a division of the proceeds.
IV. PROBLEMS REQUIRING FURTHER LEGISLATIVE
ACTION OR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The Maryland legislature, in adopting a statute with a unique
system of allocating assets acquired during marriage, has created a
disconcerting situation. The legislature not only abandoned the old
Maryland statute, but also abrogated much of the Maryland
decisional law that distributes property by means of a title theory.
Had the legislature adopted a community property system, the body
of case law that has developed in community property states would
be strong authority in statutory interpretation. As it now stands,
there are many ambiguities and problem areas that may require
either further legislative action or judicial interpretation. While
awaiting interpretation by the courts or amendment by the General
Assembly, both attorneys and litigants will be faced with uncer-
tainty about the meaning and scope of several provisions of the
statute. Because the Maryland statute is a hybrid of other state
systems that regulate the disposition of property upon dissolution of
marriage, no one body of state law can provide guidance in
interpreting the statute. Attorneys litigating issues will have to
resort to analogous features in other state laws as authority until the
issues presented are resolved by Maryland appellate courts. This
section discusses some of the problem areas and, where possible,
offers guidance from court decisions in other states.
A. The Nature of the Right Created
The resolution of several questions regarding the statute may
turn on the characterization given to the nature of the right created
19791 391
Baltimore Law Review
by this statute.8 9 Although no state has a property disposition law
that is similar in every respect to the Maryland statute, there are
parts of other state statutes that are similar to parts of the Maryland
statute. 90 Certain aspects of the Maryland statute also resemble
support and maintenance as well as the common law right of
dower. 91 The methods of division of property in other states,
although the details vary greatly, can be divided into three general
categories: (1) the common law method of distribution solely on the
basis of title, (2) the common law method that permits an equitable
distribution of property, and (3) the community property method.92
Unlike statutes in certain common law states,93 the Maryland
statute does not authorize an equitable distribution of property upon
divorce. Instead, the statute authorizes a monetary award based
upon the value of the property. Such an award, however, resembles
an equitable distribution of property because it accomplishes the
same purpose as a legal transfer of title, namely an adjustment of
the equities of the parties concerning property acquired during
marriage. Thus, common law states permitting an equitable
distribution may provide appropriate authority for resolving
problems concerning the monetary award, the factors to be
considered, and the types of property subject to division. Unlike the
common law states in which the property interest is inchoate and
arises only upon divorce, community property states grant to a
spouse an immediate interest in property acquired during the
marriage.94 Although the Maryland statute creates such an interest
only in the event of marriage dissolution, nonetheless in both cases
the interest arises out of the marital relationship.
89. The nature of the property right can be important in determining whether the
monetary award can be discharged in bankruptcy, see text accompanying notes
209 through 211 infra; whether contempt may be used to enforce the order, see
text accompanying notes 202 through 205 infra; and whether the statute
contravenes due process of law by taking a vested property right, see text
accompanying notes 109 through 119 infra. The nature of the property right
created will also have important implications under the federal income tax laws.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See generally Section Report
of the MSBA Section of Taxation, The Effect of 1978 Maryland Divorce Law
Reform Upon the Income Taxation of Appreciated Property Incident to the
Dissolution of a Marriage, Winter 1978 MD. B.J. 30 (1978).
90. See notes 142 and 176 infra.
91. See notes 102 through 108 and accompanying text infra.
92. See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1,
1978, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4033, 4037 (1978).
93. Id. The jurisdictions are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
generally Freed, Equitable Distributions in the Common Law States: A Bird'i
Eye View, in ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE 21 (1978).
94. See Freed & Foster, supra note 92, at 4037. The states are Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, and Washington.
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The philosophy of the community property system is that the
husband and wife are one and the efforts expended by one during
the marriage inure to the benefit of the other. This is similar to the
philosophy of the Maryland statute in so far as it views marriage as
a partnership between equals and values both monetary and non-
monetary contributions to a marriage in the acquisition of property
and compensates accordingly if a marriage is dissolved. Therefore,
decisions in community property states may provide authority for
determining, for example, whether a particular item is subject to
division. 95
The monetary award authorized by the Maryland statute also
has many similarities to alimony in gross,96 which is a lump sum
award for "the present value of a wife's inchoate marital rights. '97
Both the monetary award and alimony in gross are intended as a
final termination of property rights.98 The indicia of alimony in
gross are an unequivocal provision in the divorce decree for payment
of a sum certain at a time certain and a vested right to the amount.99
Lump sum alimony survives the death of either spouse and is neither
terminable nor modifiable. These enumerated characteristics are
also present at least by implication in Maryland's statutorily created
monetary award. Although the statutes in those states providing for
alimony in gross do not specifically provide that its purpose is to
effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, alimony in gross
has been viewed by courts as a property settlement'00 to compensate
a wife for her non-monetary contributions to the marriage. 10
In addition, certain aspects of the property right created in
Maryland also resemble alimony, support, and the common law
doctrines of dower and curtesy. For example, the award of
possession of the family home and family use personal property and
the concomitant power to order payment of the mortgage and other
expenses resemble alimony and child support rather than a division
of property. Child support 10 2 and alimony 0 3 are monetary allowan-
ces for the maintenance and support of a minor child and a spouse.
95. E.g., In re Graham, __ Colo. -, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71
Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976); Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah
1978); Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1977).
96. See Freed & Foster, supra note 92, at 4037. The strict common law states that
award alimony in gross are Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Ohio.
97. Hager v. Hager, 293 Ala. 47, 55, 299 So. 2d 743, 750 (1974).
98. Leo v. Leo, 280 Ala. 9, 12-13, 189 So. 2d 558, 561 (1966) ("a final termination of
the property rights and relations of the parties"); Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325,
328 (Fla. 1976) ("a final property settlement").
99. Hardwick v. Hardwick, 55 Ala. App. 156, 314 So. 2d 76 (1975).
100. Ex parte Parker, 334 So. 2d 911 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976); Terry v. Terry, 160 Ind.
App. 653, 313 N.E.2d 83 (1974).
101. Goldman v. Goldman, 333 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1976).
102. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952).
103. Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 154 A. 95 (1931).
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Both alimony and the use and possession award cease upon the
remarriage of the recipient spouse. 10 4 Once decreed, the right to
alimony may not be relitigated. 10 5 The amount awarded, however, is
subject to modification for changed circumstances. Likewise, the use
and possession award is subject to modification or termination as
justice requires.10 6 Because both the purpose and the conditions of
the award are similar to support and alimony, principles governing
support and alimony awards may be useful in interpreting the
family home and family use personal property section of the statute.
Finally, two other concepts that may be of assistance in
interpreting the new Maryland statute are the common law doctrines
of dower 0 7 and curtesy. 1 8 These rights are inchoate, arising only
upon death, and are created by operation of law because of the
marital relationship. The spouse's interest created by the new
Maryland statute is also an inchoate right, arising only upon
divorce, and created by the law as a result of the marital
relationship. Although the Maryland statute gives a spouse an
interest in the value of an equitable portion of both the real and
personal property owned at the time of divorce, rather than a life
estate at death, many features are similar and the past treatment by
the Maryland courts of dower and curtesy may prove to be useful in
interpreting portions of this statute.
B. Due Process
Prior to January 1, 1979, the effective date of the new statute,
each spouse upon divorce retained ownership, use, and possession of
the property to which he held title. Sections 3-6A-05 and 3-6A-06 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, however, authorize a
court to "grant a monetary award as an adjustment of the equities
and rights of the parties concerning marital property" and to issue
use and possession orders of the "family home" and "family use
personal property" to a spouse with custody of a minor child.
Because these provisions may apply to property acquired before
January 1, 1979 and thus apply retroactively to affect vested
property rights, the statute may be subject to constitutional
challenge on the ground that it deprives a spouse of property
104. Compare Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 6 A.2d 366 (1939), and Simpson v.
Simpson, 18 Md. App. 626, 308 A.2d 410 (1973) (alimony) with Md. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-06(a) (Supp. 1978) (use and possession award).
105. Hughes v. Hughes, 216 Md. 374, 377, 140 A.2d 649, 651 (1958) ("[T]he right to
alimony cannot ordinarily be relitigated.").
106. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-06(e) (Supp. 1978).
107. Dower is the right of a surviving wife to a life estate in real estate owned by her
husband during coveture. Lefteris v. Poole, 234 Md. 34, 198 A.2d 250 (1964).
108. Curtesy is the interest of a husband in a life estate in all the lands of which his
wife was seised during their marriage. Rice v. Hoffman, 35 Md. 344 (1872).
394 [Vol. 8
Property Disposition Upon Divorce
acquired before January 1, 1979 without due process of law.10 9 Recent
decisions in other jurisdictions, which have upheld similar statutes
providing for equitable distribution of marital assets, indicate,
however, that the Maryland statute would probably withstand such
a constitutional attack. 1 0
The courts that upheld statutes with a similar effect have used
the following reasoning. Because marriage is a social relation
subject to the police powers of the state,"' the extent of the state's
power over marriage and divorce is defined by the restrictions of its
police power."1 2 A limited, reasonable, nondiscriminatory invasion of
property rights is permitted by a state in the exercise of its police
power, provided the power is exercised for a legitimate state
purpose. 1 3 These courts have reasoned that the state has a
legitimate interest in assuring that the contributions of a spouse to
the prosperity of a marriage are recognized and that each spouse
receives a fair share of the estate accumulated during the mar-
riage. 1 14 Thus, the courts concluded that the state's interest in
creating an equitable disposition of property upon divorce outweighs
109. It is assumed for the purposes of this discussion that the Maryland courts will
interpret this statute as affecting both marriages which have occurred and
property which was acquired before the effective date of the statute. This is
probably the interpretation that will be made by the courts. See Rothman v.
Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1977). See generally Bill Review letter from Francis B. Burch, Attorney
General to Acting Governor Blair Lee (May 25, 1978).
110. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); Fournier v.
Fournier, 376 A.2d 100 (Me. 1977); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974) (statutes permitting
property to be distributed on an equitable basis by actually changing title to
property); Kittrell v. Kittrell, 56 Tenn. App. 584, 409 S.W.2d 179 (1966) (a statute
enacted after title to property became vested could not be applied to effect a
transfer of title from one spouse to another but a restriction on the alienation of
the property to secure the payment of child support was permissible); Wilcox v.
Pa. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947) (statute that created a
present vested interest in property solely owned before the effective date of the
statute violated due process).
Constitutional issues based upon grounds other than due process were also
dealt with by these state courts. Such a statute is not an ex post facto law
because that concept applies only to criminal statutes. Rothman v. Rothman, 65
N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974). The marriage relation is not encompassed within
the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. Id.; Corder v.
Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo Ct. App. 1977) (relying upon Maynad v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190 (1888)). Nor is a statute authorizing an "equitable" distribution of property
without precise guidelines void for vagueness. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320
A.2d 484 (1974); Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100 (Me. 1977).
111. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
112. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); Fournier v.
Fournier, 376 A.2d 100 (Me. 1977).
113. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
114. M v. M, 321 A.2d 115 (Del. 1974). In M v. M the former Delaware statute in
question provided that at the time of divorce, the wife could be awarded the
property of the husband but did not permit the husband to be awarded the
property of the wife. In a challenge based on equal protection the court held that
the classification was justified by a compelling state purpose.
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the limited invasion of property rights. 115 Under statutes authorizing
an equitable distribution of property, the courts reasoned that either
spouse may own or dispose of property in any fashion during the
marriage. Because their property rights are affected only when
divorce intervenes, a spouse is not denied due process of law.116
Furthermore, prior to the adoption of these statutes, property of one
spouse was subject to interests of the other based upon general
equitable principles.' 17 Thus, the new statutes were construed merely
to extend existing ground for intervention by courts of equity by
establishing an expanded basis for equitable jurisdiction. 1 8 Thus,
such statutes were held to be valid exercises of a state's police power
and, therefore, constitutional." 9
The statutes that were challenged and upheld on constitutional
grounds in other states permitted a court to change title from one
spouse to another. In certain respects, the case for the constitutional-
ity of the Maryland statute is stronger than in the states where such
statutes were upheld. First, unlike property disposition statutes in
other jurisdictions, Maryland courts are not authorized to divest one
spouse of title to property and vest it in the other as was the case in
states where statutes have been upheld.12 Rather, their power is
limited to a monetary award based upon the value of the property.' 2'
Second, although one party may be denied possession of the family
home and the family use personal property for up to three years,
even though that property is solely owned by one spouse, it is merely
a temporary denial of possession rather than a permanent divesti-
ture of title. Because the family home and family use personal
property award more closely resembles support than property
division and courts unquestionably have the power to award both
115. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Il. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); Corder v.
Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219,
320 A.2d 496 (1974).
116. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); Fournier v.
Fournier, 376 A.2d 100 (Me. 1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d
496 (1974).
117. Property in Maryland was also subject to equitable interests. Reed v. Reed, 109
Md. 690, 72 A. 414 (1909). Cf. Brucker v. Benson, 209 Md. 247, 121 A.2d 230 (1956)
(court refused to consider the effect of fraud or undue influence because it was not
raised below); Mountford v. Mountford, 181 Md. 212, 29 A.2d 258 (1942)
(husband's evidence held insufficient to establish a resulting trust with respect to
property in which wife held legal title).
118. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); Rothman v.
Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
119. States are constitutionally permitted greater flexibility in regulating divorce
than is permitted in regulating marriage. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
120. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§3-6A-03(a), 3-6A-04(a), 3-6A-05 (Supp.
1978).
121. Id. §3-6A-05.
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alimony and child support pursuant to a divorce, 122 it would seem a
court would also be found to have the power to award use of
property.
Moreover, two decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
indicate that the court may look favorably upon this statute. In its
1970 decision in Silberman v. Jacobs123 the court of appeals upheld a
statute abolishing dower 124 notwithstanding argument that the
statute was a taking of a vested property right.125 The Silberman
court reasoned that the Supreme Court had held that dower is not a
vested right but is an inchoate right, which a state legislature has
the power to abridge. 126 Because dower and the property right
created by the new statute are similar in that both are inchoate and
arise out of the marital relationship, it is likely that Maryland courts
would apply the same broad standard of legislative authority in this
area as was enunciated by the Silberman court.
The second more recent decision, Bender v. Bender,127 adopted a
presumption 2 that household furnishings and personal property
used in the home are owned as tenants by the entirety despite the
fact that the evidence in the case was undisputed that the husband
was the only spouse with income and, therefore, the only one who
could have purchased the property. 129 The court acknowledged that
under the law prior to the Bender decision the husband would have
had sole ownership of the property, but in adopting the Bender
presumption, the court recognized non-monetary contributions to a
marriage, thereby highlighting policy considerations similar to
those motivating the General Assembly to adopt the statute. Thus,
both the Silberman and the Bender decisions indicate that the Court
of Appeals of Maryland views the policy considerations relevant to
property disposition in a manner that parallels those influencing
other state courts that have upheld statutes similar to the new
Maryland law in the face of constitutional attack.
C. Spousal Death and the Use and Possession Award
The statute is silent as to the effect of spousal death on a use and
possession award. It is not clear whether a personal representative
would be required to honor an order to make mortgage payments
122. See text accompanying notes 102 through 106 supra.
123. 259 Md. 1, 267 A.2d 209 (1970).
124. The current provision is MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §3-202 (1974). Section
3-202 provides as follows: "The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished."
125. Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1, 22-23, 267 A.2d 209, 220 (1970).
126. Id. at 12-19, 267 A.2d at 215-19.
127. 282 Md. 525, 386 A.2d 772 (1978).
128. Id. at 534, 386 A.2d at 778-79.
129. Id. at 527, 386 A.2d at 774.
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and maintenance expenditures. 130 In fact, the statute is unclear as to
whether the use and possession award survives the death of a party.
Because property subject to a use and possession award may not be
distributed until the expiration of the award, this omission could
delay estate settlement for up to three years. This is an area of the
law that could be remedied by legislative amendment.
D. Scope of Marital Property
1. Division of property
One of the most important interpretative problems with the new
statute is the absence of precise guidelines for the disposition of
property. The statute does not provide a presumption of equality to
begin the process of division of marital property. Both the language
of the factors to be considered and the intent expressed both in the
preamble to the bill and in the Report of the Domestic Relations
Commission, however, indicate that the General Assembly may
have intended the court to begin with an equal division of the
property and use the enumerated factors only to justify variation
from this equality. 31 The Senate version of the bill specifically
included the "presumption of equality,"' 32 but the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Delegates deleted this provision. 33 It is
difficult to tell whether this deletion was made because of an
objection to the concept of equality or whether the Committee's
position was that the presumption of equality was evident and the
clause was redundant in view of the overall context of the bill. A.
presumption of equality would follow the judicial statutory construc-
tion of other states that have equally vague statutory language.134
2. Homemaker Services
Under previous Maryland law, a wife's work either in the home
or in the husband's business, absent a finding of a partnership, did
not entitle her to a share of the property titled in her husband's
name. 135 Even payment of the household expenses did not justify a
division of property between the parties. 136 Presumably this rule was
130. See letter from Albert S. Barr, Chairman of the Section of Estate and Trust Law
of the Maryland State Bar Association to Acting Governor Blair Lee, III (May 3,
1978).
131. The preamble states that the parties have "equal rights under the law." Law of
May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304, 2305.
132. S. 604 (1978) (Senate 2nd Reader) lines 260-63.
133. See amendments to Senate Bill No. 604 (3d Reading File Bill by the House
Judiciary Committee).
134. See, e.g., Hatch v. Hatch, 113 Ariz. 130, 547 P.2d 1044 (1976); Guy v. Guy, 98
Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977); Sahs v. Sahs, 48 Ill. App. 3d 610, 363 N.E.2d 156
(1977); Roe v. Roe, 556 P.2d 1246 (Mont: 1976).
135. Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 252 A.2d 171 (1969).
136. Woodall v. Woodall, 16 Md. App. 17, 293 A.2d 839 (1972).
398 [Vol. 8
Property Disposition Upon Divorce
a result of the early common law doctrine that the rendering of
services in the home was the duty of the wife. In that context, the
wife's duty was reciprocal to the husband's duty of support. The wife
was considered the mistress of the household, and was responsible
for maintaining the home and caring for the children with resources
furnished by the husband. 137 She acquired no interest in property
acquired during the marriage. Support by her husband was
considered renumeration for her services. This rule survived in the
early common law of Maryland.13 It is slowly being transformed by
the changing social and economic status of women and their legal
positions, 39 but it has never been totally abrogated by either
legislation or court decision.
The disposition of property statute does not explicitly mention
homemaker services as a factor to consider in calculating a spouse's
contribution to a marriage. Both the purpose of the statute and the
factors for consideration, however, indicate that the probable
legislative intent was to place a value on such services.' 4 The report
of the Commission on Domestic Relations Laws declared,
The Commission does not believe that the people of
Maryland today hold the view that a spouse whose activities
within the marriage do not include the production of income
has 'never contributed anything toward the purchase of'
property acquired by either or both during the marriage. Its
members believe that non-monetary contributions within a
marriage are real and should be recognized in the event that
the marriage is dissolved or annulled.As a homemaker and
parent and housewife and handyman (of either sex) ...
each owes a duty to contribute his or her best efforts to the
marriage, the undertakings of each are for the benefit of the
family unit.' 4 '
137. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 181 (1968).
138. Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955).
139. For example, the criminal statute penalizing non-compliance with the common
law rule that a husband must support his wife has been amended to make it a
crime for either spouse to fail to support the other. Law of May 29, 1978, ch. 921,
1978 Md. Laws 2703 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 88(a) (Supp. 1978)). See
generally Comment, Decriminalization of Non-Support in Maryland - A Re-
examination of a Uniform Act Whose Time Has Arrived, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 97
(1977).
140. Id. at 2305 and 2308-09. The trend among states recently adopting statutes
authorizing a disposition of property based on equitable considerations is to
include specifically homemaker services as a factor to consider. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1)(a) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)(b) (Supp.
1977); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-910(b) (West Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
§503(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. §31-1-11.5-11(a) (Burns
Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, § 722-A(1)(A) (Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 453.330.1(1) (Vernon 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977).
141. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAws 3 (Jan.
1978) (quoting Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 130, 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969)).
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The report also refers to the "partnership" or unit theory of
marriage, and the valuable contributions made by the non-earning
and homemaker spouse. Accordingly, it appears that the intent was
that the support of the husband is no longer per se adequate
compensation for the non-cash contributions of the wife to the
family, because such contributions directly assist the husband in
acquiring real and personal property.
Assuming that the value of homemaker services is to be
considered in calculating the contributions of each spouse to the
family, a homemaker is faced with a difficult evidentiary burden.
While the "value" of income contributed to a family is easily proved,
providing a corresponding dollar value for household services pre-
sents difficulties. Indeed, if a homemaker's services are valued at the
fair market value of replacement services, the salary of a cook,
babysitter and maid, they may well exceed the value of the income
contributed by a wage-earner, a result not likely to have been
intended by the General Assembly.142
A more direct statement of purpose in the preamble to the
statute, and inclusion of a presumption of the equal value of the
contributions by the homemaker and the wage-earner would have
left no doubt as to the objectives of the legislation. Such a statement
would have replaced the common law concepts of marital duties and
furthermore declared that marriage is a partnership in which the
contribution of each spouse is equal. There is, in thl statute as it now
exists, no presumption of the equality of services in the marriage
and no true recognition that modern marriage is indeed a joint
undertaking.
3. Types of marital property
An additional difficulty inherent in the new law is its failure to
specify what types of property fall within the statutory category of
"marital property." This difficulty arises because the statute
provides a definition that specifies only the time period during which
such property acquires its classification. The Maryland statutory
definition expressly excludes from marital property, however, only
property acquired prior to the marriage, received through gift or
142. An Indiana court has rejected the argument that a working wife who was also
the homemaker should be entitled to a greater share of the property based upon
her dual contributions as both a homemaker and a wage earner. In re Patus, -
Ind. App. -, 372 N.E.2d 493 (1978). The Court of Appeals of Indiana refused to
adopt the dual contribution theory on the grounds that such an "argument
presupposes that a wife who works is automatically contributing more to a
marriage than a husband who works." The court held, inter alia, that the
Indiana statute directing it to consider the value of homemaker services was not
intended to apply to instances in which both spouses worked, absent "extreme
circumstances in which one partner makes virtually no homemaker contribu-
tion." Id. at -, 372 N.E.2d at 495-96.
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inheritance, or excluded by a valid agreement. Thus, a wide range of
property interests are potentially subject to classification as marital
property.
Clarification of the ambiguities in such a vague definition may
be aided by consideration of court decisions in not only community
property states, but also common law states authorizing an equitable
distribution of property. The approach to distribution of either group
of states more closely resembles the Maryland statutory scheme
than does that of states relying on the legal title theory. Unfortu-
nately, court decisions in the community property and equitable
division states are far from uniform. Some state courts, when
determining whether property is subject to division, have emphas-
ized the concept of "vesting." These courts hold that only property in
which there is an immediate vested property right,143. such as a cash
surrender value, a loan value, a redemption value, a lump sum value
or a value realizable upon death, 144 is subject to division as marital
property. Other courts, however, permit the division of the present
value of expectancy interest in property. 45
The great weight of out-of-state authority holds that certain
benefits arising from employment during the marriage, such as
vested retirement benefits,146 contingent retirement benefits includ-
ing unmatured military pensions, 147 and disability benefits, 148 are
subject to division as marital property. A variety of business
interests have also been held subject to division. For example, a
spouse's interest in a corporation, 149 a partnership or professional
143. Savage v. Savage, - Ind. App. -, 374 N.E.2d 536 (1978).
144. Ellis v. Ellis, - Colo. -, , 552 P.2d 506, 507 (1976).
145. Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); In re Brown, 15 Cal. 3d
838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976); Stern v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d
257 (1975) (dicta); Grost v. Grost, 561 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Englert v.
Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978); In re Jacobs, 20 Wash. App. 272, 579 P.2d
1023 (1978).
146. In re Pope, - Colo. -, 544 P.2d 639 (1975); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich.
App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976); Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 353 A.2d 144
(1976); Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (1975); Englert
v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978); Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d
1355 (1975).
147. Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96
Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); Beggs v. Beggs, 479 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1972);
Schroeder v. Schroeder, 271 Or. 582, 533 P.2d 350 (1975); Grost v. Grost, 561
S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); In re Jacobs, 20 Wash. App. 272, 579 P.2d 1023(1978); Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978). Contra, Ellis
v. Ellis, - Colo. -, 552 P.2d 506 (1976); Savage v. Savage, __ Ind. App.
., 374 N.E.2d 536 (1978); Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1975).
148. E.g., Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, 578 P.2d 1006 (1978) (civil service
disability benefits); Hughes v. Hughes, 132 N.J. Super. 559, 334 A.2d 379 (1975)
(workman's compensation claim); Grost v. Grost, 561 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Ct. App.
1977) (disability retirement). Contra, Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261
N.W.2d 457 (1978) (veterans disability benefits not marital property).
149. Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J. Super. 267, 372 A.2d 629 (1977).
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association, ' 51 including the value of goodwill1 5 1 and accounts
receivable,' 52 has been considered to be marital property. A variety
of other interests have been subject to division such as a tort cause of
action,5 '5 employee stock incentive plans,' 54 termination benefits
under an employment contract not yet terminated, 5 5 employer paid
retirement 15 6 and life insurance benefits, vested annuities,'5 7 and the
cash surrender value of life insurance policies. 58
While the value of an education is not an asset subject to
division, it is a factor courts may consider in determining how to
divide property.'5 9 There is a conflict as to whether an increase in
value in property acquired prior to the marriage is subject to
division,"e) although several state statutes expressly provide that it
is not.'6 ' Difficulty in determining the present value of property
interests, however, will not prevent property from being classified
and divided as marital property.'6 2
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo63 reversed a state court decision which
held that a spouse's expectancy interest in federal railroad
retirement benefits was community property despite an express
statutory provision that such benefits were non-assignable. 6 4 The
150. In re Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976) (interest of a dentist in a
professional association); Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977)
(interest in a professional association of a doctor). Contra, Johnson v. Johnson,
78 Wis. 2d 137, 254 N.W.2d 198 (1977) (accounts receivable relevant to alimony
and support, but because to be received as income, not a community asset).
151. In re Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976); In re Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481,
558 P.2d 279 (1976).
152. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). Contra, Johnson v. Johnson, 78
Wis. 2d 137, 254 N.W.2d 198 (1977).
153. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, 578 P.2d 1006 (1978); In re Mueller, 70 Cal.
App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977); DiTolvo v. DiTolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 328
A.2d 625 (1974).
154. Tucker v. Tucker, 121 N.J. Super. 539, 298 A.2d 91 (1972); In re Mollier, 33 Or.
App. 575, 577 P.2d 94 (1978).
155. In re Skaden, 19 Cal. 3d 249, 566 P.2d 249, 139 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1977).
156. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
157. Whittenburg v. Whittenburg, 523 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
158. Grost v. Grost, 561 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
159. In re Graham, - Colo. __, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d
885 (Iowa 1978).
160. Compare Corkern v. Corkern, 270 So. 2d 209 (La. Ct. App. 1972) and Painter v.
Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974) (not subject to division) with In re
Mallett, 540 P.2d 1190 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (subject to division).
161. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(b)(3) (Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 503(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, § 722-A(2)(E) (Supp.
1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330.2(5) (Vernon 1977).
162. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974); In re Goger, 27 Or. App.
729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976); Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977);
In re Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
163. 99 S. Ct. 802 (1979).
164. The statute at issue in Hisquierdo contained a provision that "no annuity or
supplemental annuity shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to
garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances
whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated ...... 45 U.S.C.
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Hisquierdo decision could have a substantial impact upon the scope
of marital property because the Court's rationale that the division of
the benefits would frustrate Congressional intent could apply to
many other federally created retirement benefits subject to similar
limitations. The Court's decision, however, specifically recognized
that it was not applicable to private and state pension plans and
retirement benefits. 16 5 Thus, the validity of state court decisions that
considered such purely private or state created rights to be marital
property subject to division would appear to be unaffected by the
Hisquierdo decision. 166
E. Definitions
1. Estrangement
One of the factors that the new statute directs be evaluated by
the court in the division of marital property is estrangement.1 6 7
Unfortunately, this term is not defined in the statute, nor does it
have a precise legal meaning.1 68 Although the popular meaning
§231m (1976). Thus, the Court found that the California Supreme Court's
decision holding Railroad Retirement Act benefits subject to community property
division,
promises to diminish that portion of the benefit Congress has said
should go to the retired worker alone, and threatens to penalize one
whom Congress has sought to protect. It thus causes the kind of injury to
federal interests that the Supremacy Clause forbids. It is not the
province of state courts to strike a balance different from the one
Congress has struck.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 99 S. Ct. 802, 813 (1979) (footnote omitted).
165. The Court limited the impact of its decision by observing that,
In this case, Congress has granted a separate spouse's benefit, and
has terminated that benefit upon absolute divorce. Different considera-
tions might well apply where Congress has remained silent on the
subject of benefits for spouses, particularly when the pension program is
a private one which federal law merely regulates. . . . Our holding
intimates no view concerning the application of community property
principles to benefits payable under programs that possess these
distinctive characteristics.
Id. at 813 n.24.
166. See, e.g., In re Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 544 P.2d 639 (1975); Hutchins v. Hutchins,
71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976); Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 353
A.2d 144 (1976); Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (1975).
State court decisions that relied upon the California Supreme Court's
decision in In re Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1977), rev'd sub nom. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 99 S. Ct. 802 (1979), to divide
federal benefits, however, would appear to be overruled by the Court's decision in
Hisquierdo. One such decision that was expressly noted by the Court is
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 557 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977), in which a
Texas court relied upon the California Supreme Court's Hisquierdo opinion and
divided Railroad Retirement Act benefits as community property. Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 99 S. Ct. 802, 808 n.15 (1979).
167. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05(b)(4) (Supp. 1978).
168. Estrangement is not defined in either BLACK's, BALLANTINE'S, or BOUVIER'S law
dictionaries.
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suggests the development of hostility in separation and divorce,
implying a consideration of all of the facts and circumstances
involved in the separation and divorce, 1'6 9 the Domestic Relations
Commission interpreted this factor to mean "fault."' 170
If the legislature intended estrangement to mean "fault" it is
unclear how the factor would be applied. Several of the factors for
consideration in making a monetary award that are enumerated in
the property disposition statute are similar to factors a court
considers in making an award of alimony. 17 1 The award of alimony
is affected by fault, but the effect varies depending upon the kind of
fault and the grounds for divorce. A spouse without grounds for
divorce is precluded from receiving alimony. 17 2 In a non-culpatory
divorce based on separation, however, fault has a varying effect.
Under such circumstances, any conduct that contributed to the
destruction of the marriage is a relevant consideration but does not
preclude alimony, unless the separation was caused by adultery or
abandonment. If such was the case, adultery and abandonment
preclude the award of alimony. 173 Therefore, it is unclear whether
169. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 875 (2d ed. 1936).
170. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS 11
(Jan. 1978).
171. The factors to be considered in awarding alimony are the husband's wealth and
earning capacity, the station in life of the parties, their physical condition and
ability to work, the length of time they have lived together, the circumstances
leading up to the divorce, and the fault that destroyed the home. Newmeyer v.
Newmeyer, 216 Md. 431, 434, 140 A.2d 892, 894 (1958).
172. Brown v. Brown, 278 Md. 672, 366 A.2d 18 (1976); Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md.
335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973); Stein v. Stein, 251 Md. 300, 247 A.2d 266 (1968). Grounds
for divorce are specified in MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 24 (a uinculo), 25 (a mensa)
(Supp. 1978).
173. Rhoad v. Rhoad, 273 Md. 459, 330 A.2d 192 (1975); Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270
Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973).
In Flanagan, the court of appeals discussed this point at some length,
observing that:
However, in those suits in which the actions of the party seeking such a
pecuniary award constitute the sole cause for the demise of the marriage,
and this wrongdoing consists of acts which are either adultery or
abandonment, then, except in rare instances where there exist extremely
extenuating circumstances, the award of any alimony would be an abuse
of discretion. We have designated adultery and abandonment not on a
whim, but because these are the only direct culpatory deeds that the
Legislature has selected by name which either authorize or can ripen
into grounds for an a vinculo divorce thereby indicating that it considers
them the more heinous of the acts which can terminate a marriage. But,
if there exists separation causing culpability other than adultery or
abandonment on one side, or fault on both sides which caused the
separation of the parties, the chancellor should consider the parties'
degree of blame as well as their relative guilt in those cases where
applicable and, in conjunction with the factors quoted earlier in this
opinion, decide upon the proper award. In this thought process, the
greater degree of fault on the part of the wife demonstrated, the greater
the need which she must show to entitle her to an award of alimony
appropriate to the circumstances otherwise existing.
Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 341-42, 311 A.2d 407, 411 (1973).
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estrangement would mean grounds for divorce, adultery, or aban-
donment, or simply any conduct contributing to the destruction of
the marriage. Because there is a lack of clarity as to how the factor
of estrangement was intended to apply as well as an ambiguity in
the meaning of the term, a statutory definition is in order, especially
in view of the modern trend not to consider fault in dividing
property. 174
2. Inconsistent statutory definitions
Amendments by the General Assembly to the definitions in the
statute175 created several ambiguities because of inconsistencies
between the definitions and the balance of the bill. It is difficult to
determine whether the intention was to change the meaning of the
substantive provisions of the statute by changing the definition, or
whether the failure to amend later sections in the statute was
inadvertent. For example, the definition of family home excludes
prior acquired property or property acquired by gift or inheritance,1 76
but the section concerning the distribution of property after the
expiration of the use and possession award includes provisions for
distributing prior acquired property or property acquired by gift or
inheritance. 177 Similarly, the definition of marital property permits
the tracing of assets acquired by gift or inheritance, 178 but the
definitions of neither the family home nor family use personal
property include this tracing provision. 179 Consequently, for exam-
ple, a house received as an inheritance would not be subject to a use
and possession award, but a house purchased with funds traceable
from an inheritance would be subject to such an award. The marital
property definition excludes property governed by a valid agree-
174. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)
(Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977). Contra, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330.1(4)
(Vernon 1977).
In a recent case, the Missouri Court of Appeals unanimously interpreted its
legislative mandate to consider the conduct of the parties when making a
division of marital property as one requiring the court to "refer to [the] general
conduct of the parties during the marriage," thereby rejecting the husband's
contention that relevant conduct was only that "which affects the marital
property." Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249, 256 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
The situation is not so clear, however, in states in which the statutory
language is silent with respect to consideration of fault in making marital
property divisions. At least one state court has held that the "concept of fault is
not relevant to such distribution[s]." Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 193, 320
A.2d 478, 482 (1974).
175. Amendments to Senate Bill No. 604 (3d Reading File Bill) by the House Judiciary
Committee, amendments 2 through 7.
176. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-6A-01(b) (Supp. 1978).
177. Id. §3-6A-06(f).
178. Id. §3-6A-01(e).
179. Id. §3-6A-01(b)-(c).
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ment'*' as does the family home definition.1 8 1 Property governed by
a valid agreement, however, is not excluded from the definition of
family use personal property.'8 2 Because the sections of the statute
dealing with the family home and family use personal property are
drafted in a parallel manner,'8 3 it is unlikely that a different
treatment of these categories was intended.
3. "Value" of the property
Presumably, the "value" of the property means the fair market
value either on the date of filing for divorce' 84 or at the time of the
hearing.' 85 It seems likely that the fair market value would be
decreased by specific liabilities relating to the property. It is not
clear, however, whether the general indebtedness of a spouse would
decrease the value, if such general indebtedness were not used to
purchase that specific property.' 86
In determining whether a property disposition is equitable, other
states have considered not only the fair market value of property but
also the type of property owned by each spouse, that is, whether the
property was income-producing or income-consuming. 8 7 The distri-
bution must be equitable both in terms of fair market value and the
income producing capacity of the property. In most cases where
property interests of the parties are substantial and varied, the
court's decision-making process will be lengthy and complicated.
4. Property acquired in contemplation of marriage
The definitions in the statute exclude property acquired prior to
marriage from the classifications of marital property, the family
180. Id. § 3-6A-01(e).
181. Id. §3-6A-01(b).
182. Id. §3-6A-01(c).
183. Id. §3-6A-01(b)-(c).
184. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
185. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, - , 578 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1978). (Community
property rights continue "until the final dissolution [of the marriage] is ordered
by the court."); In re Carruthers, - Colo. App. -, 577 P.2d 773 (1978)
(property acquired after the parties separated but before the divorce is marital
property). In re Johnson, - Colo. App. -_, 576 P.2d 188 (1978) (value at the
time of the hearing).
186. The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld a monetary award to a wife for the
amount of joint indebtedness of the parties, despite the husband's argument that
debts did not fall within the definition of marital property, and despite the fact
that the husband's obligation for the joint debts had been discharged in
bankruptcy. McCully v. McCully, 550 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
187. In re Johnsrud, 572 P.2d 902 (Mont. 1977) (in a state authorizing an equitable
distribution, it was error to award the wife one-third of the property, which was
income consuming, and two-thirds of the property to the husband, which was
income producing); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974) (the
current value and the income producing capacity of the property).
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home and family use personal property. In Bender v. Bender, 18 the
court of appeals included property acquired in contemplation of the
marriage as part of the property presumed to be jointly owned.
Bender was decided two days after the disposition of property statute
was signed by the Governor and the decision specifically took note of
the statute. 189 Thus, it appears that the court may be favorably
inclined to adopt an argument that the statutory definition should be
broadly interpreted to include property acquired in contemplation of
marriage. Because the Bender case raised a presumption of a gift of
joint ownership, under the new statute the court would also appear
to have the authority to divide property acquired prior to, but in
contemplation of, marriage under its power over personal proper-ty. 190
5. Property acquired by gift or inheritance
The statutory definitions of marital property, the family home,
and family use personal property all exclude property acquired by
gift or inheritance. Inheritance, in a strict legal sense, is property
that passes upon death by operation of law. Bequest, on the other
hand, is property disposed of by will. Because inheritance in its
popular sense means the passing of property by any means at
death,' 9' and "words of [a] statute are deemed to be used in their
ordinary and popular sense,' 92 it is likely a court would interpret
these exclusions to include property passing both by law and by
will.19
3
F. Miscellaneous Considerations
Particular attention should be paid to the fact that lis pendens
does not attach automatically upon the filing of a bill of complaint
and, therefore, must be specifically requested' 94 in order to prevent
the alienation of property titled in the name of one spouse only to a
bona fide purchaser for value while the proceeding is pending. Even
if lis pendens is ordered by the court, it attaches only for the county
in which the divorce proceeding has been filed. 95 Therefore, an
analysis will have to be made to determine whether lis pendens
should be requested in other counties.
188. 282 Md. 525, 386 A.2d 772 (1978).
189. Id. at 534 n.7, 386 A.2d at 778 n.7.
190. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-6A-03 (Supp. 1978).
191. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 922 (4th ed. 1951).
192. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Thomas, 275 Md. 628, 632, 342 A.2d 671, 674 (1975).
193. Such an interpretation would follow a court of appeals interpretation of the
meaning of inheritance in the inheritance tax statute. Mylander v. Connor, 172
Md. 329, 334, 191 A. 430, 432 (1937).
194. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §3-6A-07(b) (Supp. 1978).
195. Md. Rule BD 2.
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The court has discretion to determine the manner of payment of
the monetary award. In order to enforce child support and alimony
awards, Maryland courts may place a lien on property, enjoin a
spouse from alienating property, or require a spouse to assign
property as security for the obligation. 196 Presumably, these methods
would be available to a judge to enforce or secure a monetary award
pursuant to a disposition of property. Methods upheld in other states
include a husband's option to sell the property and divide the
proceeds, or to retain ownership and pay installments over twenty
years. 197 If part of the division of property is unmatured retirement
benefits, courts have also deferred payment to one spouse until the
other spouse begins receiving the benefits. 198
Although alimony is not generally dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy, 199 if it is intended as a property settlement it is dischargea-
ble.2" Because the statutory monetary award serves as a substitute
for a division of marital property, and thus may also be viewed as a
property settlement, it may be dischargeable as well. Thus, an
attorney should be aware of the affect of bankruptcy law.
V. CONCLUSION
The property disposition statute has certain disadvantages
compared to the prior law. Under the prior law, an attorney could
reasonably predict the outcome of a property dispute because title to
the property was the paramount consideration. The interpretation of
many areas of the new statute will not be certain for many years
until ambiguous points are finally decided by appellate courts or
resolved by the legislature. Legal expenses for parties involved in a
divorce and property dispute will undoubtedly rise because more
property will be subject to dispute and more litigation will be
required. A disturbing side effect of this statute is the probability of
increased child custody disputes- Because custody of a minor child is
a prerequisite for the award of the family home and family use
personal property, there is a likelihood of not only a greater number
of but also more vigorous custody disputes either to secure the award
of the family home or to prevent its award to the other spouse.
196. Donigan v. Donigan, 208 Md. 511, 119 A.2d 430 (1956).
197. In re Harding, 533 P.2d 947 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
198. Savage v. Savage, - Ind. App. -, 374 N.E.2d 536 (1978); Blitt v. Blitt, 139
N.J. Super. 213, 353 A.2d 144 (1976); Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1977); In re Jacobs, 20 Wash. App. 272, 579 P.2d 1023 (1978). It should be
noted, however, that the Supreme Court recently rejected a similar argument
with respect to federal benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 99 S. Ct. 802, 810 (1979). See notes 163 through 166 and
accompanying text supra.
199. 11 U.S.C. §35(a)(7) (1976).
200. Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976). See generally Branca,
Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: the Support Obligation
and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405 (1975).
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Children of the family will become pawns in the fight over property,
thereby increasing what is already the most painful aspect of
domestic relations disputes.
This statute could also precipitate other intense disputes in the
early stages of litigation. A judge has discretion to award the family
home and family use personal property pendente lite. Because of the
currently perceived tendency of judges to continue pendente lite
awards for alimony and child custody and support, and because the
most substantial asset of the average family is the family home,
more vigorous disputes of pendente lite awards can be anticipated.
Practitioners who do not practice domestic relations law must
also carefully analyze the new statute to determine its effect on their
clients in other matters. For example the value of business interests,
including accounts receivable and goodwill, would probably be
classified as marital property, and thus business interests could
become involved in valuation disputes between divorcing spouses.
Therefore, agreements for valuation, joined by spouses, should be
considered in the creation of business interests such as partnerships,
joint ventures, and close corporations. It should be noted that this
particular problem should be considered not only for the protection
of clients but also in an attorney's agreement with his partners.
Finally, because at least two of the major statutory categories of
property permit the exclusion of property from the provisions of the
statute if governed by a valid agreement, practitioners should
consider increased counseling and education in the field of
antenuptial agreements. 201
Ambiguities and disadvantages notwithstanding, this statute
makes important reforms to Maryland law and represents a first
step toward marital property reform. As a result of its enactment, a
more equitable relationship exists between spouses at the time of
divorce or annulment. Of particular importance is the fact that a
wife who chooses to remain in the home to care for her family will no
longer be penalized for such a decision should marital property be
divided pursuant to a divorce or annulment proceeding. This statute
has the additional advantage of making the law conform to public
expectations that property acquired during a marriage belongs to
201. Although a discussion of what constitutes a valid antenuptial agreement is
beyond the scope of this article, antenuptial agreements are "not unlawful."
Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 475, 121 A.2d 704, 706 (1956). Antenuptial
agreements waiving alimony are "void as against public policy." Hilbert v.
Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 375, 177 A. 914, 919 (1935). "[Ajgreements settling or
barring property rights," however, are valid and proper, provided they are fair
and equitable. Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 55, 234 A.2d 865, 870 (1967). The
subject of antenuptial agreements is one which the Commission on Domestic
Relations plans to address. See letter from Beverly Anne Groner to Hon. Blair
Lee, III (January 9, 1978) in REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
DoMEsTIc RELATIONS LAw (Jan. 1978).
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both parties equally, excepting only property that one party
inherited or received as a gift. In all likelihood the second step
toward reform will be made by the appellate courts as they interpret
various areas of the new law within the framework of the concept
that the modern marriage is a joint enterprise.
Paula Peters
ADDENDUM
Since the initial printing of this article, the Maryland General
Assembly has amended the new divorce property disposition statute.
As this issue goes to press, however, the Governor has yet to approve
the Act. Although most of the amendments are cosmetic, Senate Bill
983 (1979) eliminates one of the definitional inconsistencies noted in
the text of this article. The bill adds the words "or property excluded
by valid agreement" to the definition of family use personal property
provided in Section 3-6A-01(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.-Thus, that definition now contains identical exclusions to
those found in the definitions of family home and marital property.
Therefore, the applicable portions of the article should be read
accordingly. 20 2
202. See text accompanying notes 71, 182, and 201 supra.
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